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655 
Oklahoma’s Indigency Determination Scheme: A Call for 
Uniformity 
I. Introduction 
Consider the following scenario:1 Ann and Bob, two friends with very 
similar financial situations, are arrested at the same time, in the same 
jurisdiction, on identical charges. A computer randomly assigns them to 
different judges; Ann appears before Judge Evans and Bob appears before 
Judge Oxford.  
Ann and Bob have suffered similar financial struggles. As a result, 
neither one is able to hire an attorney. Both request that the court appoint 
attorneys to defend them. Despite Ann and Bob’s similar financial 
circumstances, Judge Evans grants Ann’s request for a court-appointed 
attorney, while Judge Oxford denies Bob’s request. Apparently, Judge 
Evans grants court-appointed attorneys more freely than Judge Oxford. 
Their fate came down to computer randomization. If Bob had been assigned 
to Judge Evans’s docket, he would have presumably received a court-
appointed attorney.  
This scenario demonstrates a flaw in Oklahoma’s current method of 
determining whether a criminal defendant is indigent and therefore entitled 
to court-appointed counsel. Oklahoma grants trial judges broad discretion in 
determining indigency status.2 And two different judges faced with the 
same set of facts may reach different conclusions. Thus, as the above 
scenario demonstrates, whether a criminal defendant receives a court-
appointed attorney may depend on which judge is assigned to hear the case. 
That decision is often made by computer randomization.3 Considering that 
the right to counsel is constitutionally protected,4 should court appointment 
be so discretionary? What other options exist? 
This Comment explores the problems inherent in such a discretionary 
system and proposes a solution. Part II begins by offering a history of the 
right to counsel, focusing on the appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants. Part III analyzes Oklahoma’s current method of determining 
indigency and offers a critique. Part IV explores alternative methods for 
indigency determination. Part V argues that Oklahoma should alter its 
                                                                                                                 
 1. The following names are fictional and are not intended to describe or refer to any 
particular criminal defendants or judges. 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 50-54. 
 3. See, e.g., Okla. Reg. 7 Dist. Ct. R. 6(A)(1) (2010); Okla. Reg. 14 Dist. Ct. Cr. R. 3 
(2003).  
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20. 
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current system to promote greater uniformity among criminal defendants. 
This Comment will explain why the best way to achieve uniformity is to 
shift the decision-making power from trial judges to the Oklahoma Indigent 
Defense System (OIDS) and apply a new test that limits discretion.  
II. Background of Indigency Standards and the Right to Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants all 
criminal defendants the right to counsel to assist them in mounting 
defenses.5 In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court declared that the Sixth 
Amendment requires the federal government to provide legal counsel to 
criminal defendants who cannot afford to hire attorneys on their own.6 The 
Court explained that if it did not appoint counsel to indigents, it would be 
ignoring the “fundamental postulate . . . ‘that there are certain immutable 
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government.’”7 
Yet one decade later, in Betts v. Brady, the Court turned away from these 
principles when it refused to extend this mandate to the states.8 In reaching 
that conclusion, the Brady Court insisted that assistance of counsel was not 
“essential to a fair trial.” 9 Because assistance of counsel was not considered 
essential, the right to that assistance was not fundamental.10 Rather, the 
Court viewed the decision to provide assistance of counsel to indigent 
defendants as a matter of state legislative policy.11 In an effort to uphold the 
principles of federalism, the Court determined that furnishing attorneys for 
the poor was a matter that must be left to the independent discretion of state 
legislatures.12 
The Court overruled Betts v. Brady in the 1963 landmark case of Gideon 
v. Wainwright.13 This decision extended the Sixth Amendment to the states 
via the Fourteenth Amendment.14 In deciding to overturn Brady, the Gideon 
Court focused on the fundamental nature of the right to counsel.15 The 
Court explained that failing to provide court-appointed attorneys to those 
                                                                                                                 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 6. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). 
 7. Id. (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)). 
 8. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 344. 
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who cannot afford representation intrudes on that right.16 Justice Black 
stated that it was “an obvious truth” that “any person haled into court, who 
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him.”17 He further noted: 
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who 
have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest 
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal 
courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with 
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential 
to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very 
beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid 
great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards 
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which 
every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal 
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to 
face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.18 
Gideon is rightly praised for extending the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
counsel to all criminal prosecutions, regardless of forum.19 But it has been 
critiqued for failing to articulate precisely how states should determine who 
qualifies for court appointment, thus leaving each state to develop its own 
system.20 One critic has argued for a federal framework for determining 
indigency.21 Another has argued for the Supreme Court to set forth clearer 
standards to be applied by the states.22 An alternative view might praise the 
current system based on the “states as laboratories” theory, which suggests 
that states serve an important role by functioning “as laboratories for 
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 572 (2005); 
Amanda Myra Hornung, Note, The Paper Tiger of Gideon v. Wainwright and the 
Evisceration of the Right to Appointment of Legal Counsel for Indigent Defendants, 3 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 495, 496 (2005). 
 20. See Gershowitz, supra note 19, at 572; Hornung, supra note 19, at 495; Allison D. 
Kuhns, If You Cannot Afford an Attorney, Will One Be Appointed for You?: How (Some) 
States Force Criminal Defendants to Choose Between Posting Bond and Getting a Court-
Appointed Attorney, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1787 (2012). 
 21. See Gershowitz, supra note 19, at 571. 
 22. Hornung, supra note 19, at 498. 
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from clear.”23 Even if one adopts this view, after nearly fifty years of 
experimentation, perhaps now is the time for academics and state legislators 
to review the states’ various methods and determine which solution is best.   
III. Oklahoma’s Indigency Determination Scheme 
A. Overview of Oklahoma’s Indigency System 
Oklahoma’s constitution contains a provision similar to that of the Sixth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, guaranteeing criminal defendants the 
right to counsel.24 Recognizing the need to provide these services for those 
who cannot afford them, the state began compensating private attorneys for 
defending indigents.25 The original appointment scheme set a maximum 
limit on the amount that lawyers could receive.26 In State v. Lynch, 
however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that the cap on fees 
deprived attorneys of their right to receive adequate compensation for their 
services.27 
The Lynch decision spurred the Oklahoma legislature to reform the 
system by which indigents receive representation.28 It did so by passing the 
Indigent Defense Act,29 which created the Oklahoma Indigent Defense 
System (OIDS) to provide representation for indigent criminal defendants.30 
The Act also sets forth the process for determining indigency, which begins 
when a criminal defendant completes an application.31 The trial judge then 
considers a list of factors promulgated by the Court of Criminal Appeals 
and renders a decision about the applicant’s indigency status.32 If the judge 
determines that the applicant is indigent, OIDS is appointed to the case.33 
OIDS then makes arrangements for representation.34 
                                                                                                                 
 23. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 24. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20 (“In all criminal prosecutions . . . the accused shall have 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel . . . .”). 
 25. See State v. Lynch, 1990 OK 82, ¶¶ 5-6, 796 P.2d 1150, 1155 (1990).  
 26. Id. ¶ 5, 796 P.2d at 1155-56. 
 27. Id. ¶ 7, 796 P.2d at 1156. 
 28. 2012 Annual Report, OKLA. INDIGENT DEF. SYS., 2 (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www. 
ok.gov/OIDS/documents/2012%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
 29. 22 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1355-1369 (2011).  
 30. Id. §§ 1355.1, 1355.6.  
 31. Id. § 1355A. 
 32. See id. The factors that were promulgated pursuant to this Act are reviewed infra in 
the text accompanying notes 48-49.  
 33. See id. 
 34. See 2012 Annual Report, supra note 28, at 2.  
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The Indigent Defense Act requires criminal defendants seeking 
indigency status to complete an application, which is commonly referred to 
as a Pauper’s Affidavit.35 The application requests information about the 
applicant’s assets and liabilities, the possibility of family assistance, and the 
applicant’s bond status.36 If the applicant has posted bond, he must include 
an additional writing naming at least three licensed attorneys he has 
contacted, and must declare that he was unable to obtain counsel.37 The 
application must be signed under oath, which carries the penalty of 
perjury.38 The statute further requires payment of a forty dollar application 
fee, which may be waived depending on the applicant’s financial status.39 
The Indigent Defense Act delegates the responsibility of promulgating 
“rules governing the determination of indigency” to the Court of Criminal 
Appeals.40 This delegation of authority is subject to one limitation—the 
posting of bond creates a rebuttable presumption that the applicant is not 
indigent.41 The only exception is when the bond is posted by the 
defendant’s personal recognizance rather than by money.42 Oklahoma views 
payment of bail as “prima facie evidence that said defendant has funds to 
employ his own attorney.”43  
The Court of Criminal Appeals responded to the Indigent Defense Act 
by promulgating Rule 1.14 of the Oklahoma Rules of the Court of Criminal 
Appeals.44 The court chose to codify the standards it previously set forth in 
Cleek v. State,45 Petition of Humphrey,46 and Bruner v. State.47 These 
standards include consideration of the applicant’s: 
 
                                                                                                                 
 35. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355A; OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. FORM 13.3.  
 36. OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. FORM 13.3. 
 37. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355A. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. Recognizance is “[a] bond or obligation, made in court, by which a person 
promises to perform some act or observe some condition, such as to appear when called, to 
pay a debt, or to keep the peace.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1386 (9th ed. 2009). 
 43. 20 OKLA. STAT. § 55 (2011). Whether or not the posting of bond should carry this 
much weight is beyond the scope of this Comment, but one critic suggests that this type of 
system unfairly forces defendants to stay in jail if they wish to keep their court-appointed 
attorney. Kuhns, supra note 20, at 1787. 
 44. See OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 1.14. 
 45. 1987 OK CR 278, ¶ 5, 748 P.2d 39, 40. 
 46. 1979 OK CR 97, ¶ 14, 601 P.2d 103, 108.  
 47. 1978 OK CR 65, ¶¶ 6-9, 581 P.2d 1314, 1317 .  
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1. ability and decision to post an appeal bond;48 
2. assets and their liquidity;  
3. debts and liabilities; 
4. financial history; 
5. earning capacity;  
6. living expenses; 
7. credit standing;  
8. family size; 
9. number of dependents; and  
10. ability and willingness of family members to assist financially.49 
 
By simply adopting guidelines that were already established by judicial 
precedent, the Court of Criminal Appeals essentially told district judges to 
keep up the good work.  
The text of Rule 1.14 reveals the intent of the Court of Criminal Appeals 
to grant broad discretion to trial judges in determining indigency.50 First, 
the Rule codifies standards adopted in three different cases, two of which 
specifically held that the trial court has discretion in making its 
determination.51 Second, the Rule clearly expresses that the list of 
guidelines is illustrative, allowing trial courts to add to that list if they deem 
it necessary and appropriate to do so.52 Thus, trial judges have discretion in 
determining exactly what factors to consider and how much weight to place 
on each one. The only check on the trial judge’s discretion is appellate 
review.53 But even during review of the lower court’s decision, appellate 
courts give great deference to trial judges.54 
                                                                                                                 
 48. An appeal bond allows for a defendant’s sentence to be postponed until after he has 
appealed the trial court’s ruling. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1058 (2011). In most criminal cases, a fee 
is required to stay execution of the sentence. Id. Appeal bonds are used to ensure that the 
defendant continues to adhere to court orders while the case is waiting for or undergoing 
appeal. Gibson v. State, 1982 OK 151, ¶ 5, 655 P.2d 1028, 1029.  
 49. OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 1.14. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.; Cleek v. State, 1987 OK CR 278, ¶ 4, 748 P.2d 39, 40 (overruled in part by 
Norton v. State, 2002 OK CR 10, ¶ 12, 43 P.3d 404, 408); Bruner, ¶ 7, 581 P.2d at 1316. 
 52. OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 1.14 (stating that the “guidelines include, but are not 
limited to” the factors enumerated above). 
 53. See, e.g., Brewer v. State, 1975 OK CR 52, ¶ 8, 533 P.2d 645, 646-47 (declaring 
that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel). 
 54. See Parks v. Lindley, 1990 OK CR 18, ¶ 4, 789 P.2d 248, 250-51 (upholding the 
“general principle” that trial judges maintain discretion in determining a criminal 
defendant’s financial status). 
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If the trial judge determines that an applicant is indigent, the defendant 
will be appointed counsel. Oklahoma’s two largest counties, Oklahoma and 
Tulsa, maintain their own indigent defense systems.55 OIDS is appointed in 
the remaining seventy-five counties.56 In fifty-six of the latter counties, 
OIDS always contracts out its noncapital appointments to private attorneys, 
essentially maintaining the pre-Indigent Defense Act system of providing 
representation but without capping attorney’s fees.57 OIDS staff attorneys 
handle most of the appointments in the remaining nineteen counties.58 Yet, 
even in these counties, OIDS contracts out to private attorneys to represent 
conflict and overload cases, so long as those cases are trial hearings that do 
not involve capital punishment.59  
B. Most Jurisdictions Take a Similar Approach 
Most state and federal jurisdictions adopt an approach similar to 
Oklahoma.60 The federal government grants nearly unfettered discretion to 
district judges in determining indigency.61 And at least thirty-one states and 
the District of Columbia grant discretion to trial judges in determining 
indigency, although nearly every jurisdiction varies the exact breadth of 
discretion permitted.62  
Although these jurisdictions take the same general approach as 
Oklahoma, some require or encourage judges to consider different or 
additional factors. For example, Alabama considers “the nature of the 
offense” as well as “the effort and skill required to gather pertinent 
information and the length and complexity of the proceedings.”63 Kansas 
takes into account the amount “which must be incurred to support the 
defendant and the defendant's immediate family.”64 Washington looks to 
                                                                                                                 
 55. 19 OKLA. STAT. § 138.1a(A) (2011); Frequently Asked Questions, OKLA. INDIGENT 
DEF. SYS., http://www.ok.gov/OIDS/faqs.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
 56. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 55. 
 57. 2012 Annual Report, supra note 28, at 2. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See infra Appendix A. 
 61. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)(2006) (“The court may request an attorney to represent any 
person unable to afford counsel.”). The statute neither offers guidance nor limits discretion.  
 62. See infra Appendix A. 
 63. ALA. CODE § 15-12-5 (LexisNexis 1975). 
 64. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4504 (2007). 
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whether or not the applicant receives public assistance.65 And Louisiana 
considers “job training history” and “level of education.”66   
Additionally, some of these jurisdictions delegate promulgating 
guidelines to entities other than the criminal appellate court. In Tennessee, 
for example, the state legislature created the list of factors that the judge is 
to consider.67 Some jurisdictions employ additional measures to determine 
indigency. A trial judge in Kansas will often interrogate the defendant as to 
his financial status and direct county officers to launch an investigation into 
the defendant’s financial condition.68 Yet in spite of these minor variations, 
these jurisdictions have all adopted the general approach of allowing judges 
to exercise discretion in determining indigency status.  
C. A Critique of Oklahoma’s Approach 
The guidelines set by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals allow 
trial judges to exercise broad discretion in determining indigency status.69 
Although discretion permits flexibility, which allows judges to evaluate 
each case based on its unique facts, it also tends to cause a lack of 
uniformity in decisions and undermines one of our nation’s most 
fundamental principles—equality before the law. 
1. The Benefit of Discretion: Flexibility 
Consider the following scenarios: Two applicants appear before a judge 
to request a court-appointed attorney. One applicant has a very low income 
level, which initially suggests that the applicant ought to be provided a 
court-appointed attorney. Yet after some digging, the judge learns that the 
applicant is bright, healthy, and able to obtain higher income.  The 
defendant simply prefers not to.  
Alternatively, consider an applicant with a slightly higher income. The 
higher income alone suggests that he can likely afford his own attorney. But 
this applicant’s higher income is insufficient to pay the vast amount of 
medical bills that have resulted from an unfortunate accident. Moreover, the 
accident left the applicant disabled, so he is unable to obtain any additional 
income.  
In this hypothetical, flexibility would allow the judge to weigh each 
applicant’s unique circumstances to determine who genuinely needs the 
                                                                                                                 
 65. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.101.020 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 66. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:175 (Supp. 2012). 
 67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-14-205 (2011). 
 68. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4504. 
 69. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54. 
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assistance. Although both applicants lack resources now, one has the 
physical and mental means of obtaining additional resources, while the 
other has a cumulating stack of debt that consumes the few resources he is 
physically able to obtain. In a system of rigid standards, a judge perhaps 
would be forced into appointing an attorney to the former applicant but not 
the latter one, based solely on their respective incomes. Should taxpayer 
money be spent on funding the legal defense of one who has voluntarily 
selected a low-income lifestyle, but not one who has, through no choice of 
his own, been plagued by hardship? Such an outcome contradicts the 
Gideon Court’s view that the state has an obligation to assist those who 
cannot obtain counsel solely on their own means. 
2. The Downside of Discretion: Lack of Uniformity 
Although flexibility may at times uphold the spirit of Gideon, it does so 
at a cost. While judges are highly capable of setting aside their personal 
opinions and beliefs to render decisions based solely on the law, 
discretionary determinations encourage—perhaps even require—judges to 
incorporate their own unique views in rendering a decision. An approach 
that encourages varying decision makers to incorporate their own personal 
beliefs naturally results in a lack of uniformity among the decisions 
rendered.   
Equal treatment, uniformity, and predictability are all valued principles 
in our society and, consequently, our legal system.70 Justice Antonin Scalia 
illustrates the importance of equality in our society by describing a 
hypothetical wherein a young child (one who often has the keenest sense of 
fairness) reacts very strongly toward unequal treatment: If you tell a child 
that no one can have ice cream, she will eventually get over it.71 However, 
if you tell that same child that everyone else can have ice cream, but do not 
provide her with a clear, objective reason for denying her ice cream, the 
child will articulate an instinctive sense of unfairness.72 The fact that young 
children are quick to identify and speak out against unequal treatment is 
demonstrative of how important equality is to our society.73 This spirit has 
found its way into our legal system—most notably into our nation’s most 
fundamental law, the Constitution, via the Fourteenth Amendment.74  
                                                                                                                 
 70. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 
(1989). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
664 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:655 
 
 
Unfortunately, there are times when the principles of equality, 
uniformity, and predictability conflict with finding the “perfect” answer in a 
particular case.75 In certain circumstances, such as the above hypothetical 
involving the two applicants with different income levels, flexibility may 
allow a court to uphold the spirit of Gideon. However, forsaking the 
broader principles of equality, uniformity, and predictability in order to 
achieve this outcome undercuts the overall value of our legal system by 
removing the appearance of equal treatment under the law. As the 
introductory scenario suggests, discretion often leads to individuals with 
similar financial circumstances getting different results—or unequal 
treatment—simply because they were appointed different judges. These 
differences not only occur among different states, counties, or 
municipalities, but often occur even within the same county or municipal 
court.   
3. The Stakes 
The discrepancy in outcomes is particularly troubling when viewed in 
light of the importance of having counsel to assist in mounting a defense 
against the state’s overwhelming power. In Powell v. Alabama, the 
hallmark case wherein the Court recognized the need to provide 
representation to those who cannot afford it, Justice Sutherland articulated 
how the appointment of counsel may affect the merits of a case.76 He 
highlighted the unique knowledge and skills that lawyers possess, such as 
an understanding of the rules of evidence, which are essential to the 
mounting of a proper defense.77 Without these skills and knowledge, even a 
bright, innocent man may be unable to prepare an adequate defense.78 
Because a proper defense requires the application of these unique skills, an 
unrepresented criminal defendant “faces the danger of conviction because 
he does not know how to establish his innocence.”79  
If, as Justice Sutherland suggested, an innocent man can easily be 
convicted simply because he did not defend himself the “right” way, it 
follows that those who are unable to get assistance in launching the “right” 
defense may be more prone to wrongful conviction than those who can 
afford representation. Of course, court-appointed attorneys are intended to 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. 
 76. 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. 
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fill this gap. Otherwise, there would be a socioeconomic inequality under 
the law.   
The severity of this discrepancy between classes deepens further when 
viewed in light of the repercussions of incarceration. The most obvious 
losses are also perhaps the most important—lost time and liberty, which the 
incarcerated are never able to get back. Additionally, incarcerated 
individuals suffer deplorable conditions while in confinement. For example, 
in 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice investigated the conditions of the 
Oklahoma County Jail and found numerous issues that threatened the 
health, safety, and constitutional rights of the inmates.80 These issues 
included, but were not limited to, the following: 
 
o Overcrowding: Although the jail was only built to house 1,250 
inmates, there were more than 2,500 inmates held there in April 
of 2007.81 Due to the overcrowding, inmates were forced to sleep 
“under tables, next to toilets, and underneath bunk beds.”82 
 
o Inmate-on-inmate violence: During a two-month period in early 
2007, there were seventy reported inmate-on-inmate assaults, 
which resulted in numerous serious injuries and two inmate 
deaths.83 
 
o Staff-on-inmate force: “[B]etween January 2006 and March 
2007, there were 1,337 reported uses of force” by staff, including 
physical force and four-point restrictions.84 
 
o Inadequate treatment and management of communicable 
diseases: There were twenty-one cases of tuberculosis at the jail 
in 2006, sixteen of which broke out in a single month.85 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 80. Letter from Grace Chung Becker, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to Willa Johnson 
et al., Comm’rs of Oklahoma County Jail (July 31, 2008), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/crt/about/spl/documents/OKCounty_Jail_findlet_073108.pdf.  
 81. Id. at 2. 
 82. Id. at 17. 
 83. Id. at 6. 
 84. Id. at 8. 
 85. Id. at 16. 
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o Inadequate access to medical care during emergencies: In 2005, 
a pregnant inmate gave birth while handcuffed to a handrail.86 
The inmate insisted that her water had broken and requested to 
lie down.87 Detention officers dismissed the woman’s cries, 
forcing her to birth her child alone.88 The baby was soon 
pronounced dead.89 
 
The consequences continue far beyond time served. Prison records lead 
to disadvantages in the labor market, including increased unemployment 
and slow wage growth.90 Moreover, there is a social stigma of 
incarceration, which, when combined with the time spent serving his 
sentence, strains the inmate’s present relationships and affects his ability to 
acquire new ones.91 As one court rightly stated, “Any incarceration of over 
thirty days, more or less, will usually result in loss of employment, with a 
consequent substantial detriment to the defendant and his family.”92 
Not only does incarceration have serious costs for those convicted, but it 
is also very expensive for taxpayers. During the fiscal year of 2012, the 
state of Oklahoma expended between $13,647 and $28,652 per incarcerated 
individual.93 Moreover, the average sentence length is seven years.94 Thus, 
it would cost Oklahoma taxpayers approximately $148,046.50 to 
incarcerate an innocent person who was accused of an average crime.95 In 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. at 14. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-term Effects of 
Incarceration on Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115, 115-16 (2007) (citing ROBERT J. 
SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING: PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS 
THROUGH LIFE (1993)). 
 91. See Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, and the 
Future of Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 873-74 (2009).  
 92. Marston v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691, 696 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev’d, 485 F.2d 705 (4th 
Cir. 1973). 
 93. Facts at a Glance April 2013, OKLA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS (Apr. 30, 2013), 
http://www.ok.gov/doc/documents/DOC_Facts_At_A_Glance_April_2013.pdf. 
 94. Fiscal Year 2010 Receptions, Incarcerations, and Releases, OKLA. DEP’T OF 
CORRECTIONS, http://www.ok.gov/doc/documents/FY10_Report.txt (last visited Sept. 13, 
2013). This calculation excludes sentences with abnormally short or long terms, such as 
delayed, life, and death sentences. Id. 
 95. This number was calculated by the following means: First, the average cost of 
incarceration is $21,149.50, which is the average of $13,647 and $28,652. See Facts at a 
Glance April 2013, supra note 93. Second, multiplying this annual average by the average 
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contrast, OIDS only expends an estimated $355 per year per indigent 
defendant.96 Without a doubt, it is in the economic interest of the state to 
provide representation for those who cannot afford it themselves, as it is 
dramatically more costly to incarcerate an innocent defendant than it is to 
provide her with representation.  
For those applicants who are neither clearly “indigent” nor clearly “able 
to afford an attorney,” freedom may lie in the hands of the one who 
determines whether they are appointed attorneys. When those decisions are 
made by judges who are left to make the determinations based on their own 
discretion, the outcome may not be uniform. As a result, it is possible that 
two applicants with identical financial means may not experience equality 
before the law; one may be appointed counsel, who knows how to render a 
proper defense, while the other is forced to go it alone. Given the severity 
of incarceration and the injustice that results from unequal treatment, a 
system that yields more uniform outcomes is highly preferable to one that 
varies upon the individual views of the decision maker.   
IV. Alternatives to Oklahoma’s Approach 
There are three notable alternatives to Oklahoma’s current indigency 
determination scheme that would promote greater uniformity. The first 
alternative would apply a bright-line test, as is used in Florida to determine 
indigency and in Oklahoma to determine eligibility for other government 
assistance programs. The second alternative would create a new grid-like 
framework similar to the one that was originally created by Congress for 
use in federal sentencing. The third alternative, which could be combined 
with either of the first two, would transfer the decision-making power to the 
public defender program, OIDS. The following sections explore each of 
these options.  
  
                                                                                                                 
number of years sentenced, seven, results in a $148,046.50 cost to taxpayers over the course 
of the incarceration. See Fiscal Year 2010 Receptions, Incarcerations, and Releases, supra 
note 94.  
 96. Telephone Interview with Joe Robertson, Exec. Dir., OIDS (June 24, 2013). OIDS 
has an annual budget of $16,000,000 and they represent approximately 45,000 indigent 
defendants per year. Id. Of course, the exact amount spent on a particular case varies with its 
complexity. Id.  
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A. Option 1: Applying Bright-Line Rules 
1. Current Uses of Bright-Line Tests   
Justice Powell once stated that “[t]he line between indigency and 
assumed capacity to pay for counsel is necessarily somewhat arbitrary.”97 
Perhaps this does not have to be true. At least one state, Florida, disagrees 
with Justice Powell and believes that indigency can be more clearly 
defined, in a more objective and measurable way, through a bright-line 
test.98 In Florida, the court clerk makes the determination after “comparing 
the information provided in the application to the criteria prescribed” by 
statute.99 The legislature views this criteria as so determinative that it 
characterizes the clerk’s role as “a ministerial act” rather than as an 
“exercise of independent judgment by the clerk.”100 The clerk is to declare 
an applicant indigent if her income is below a prescribed level or if she 
receives benefits from an enumerated list of assistance programs, unless she 
has assets valued at more than a prescribed amount.101 The statute 
authorizes the clerk to conduct further review of the applicant’s public 
financial records, so long as the clerk drafts a memo setting forth her 
findings.102 In case this ministerial act results in a seeming injustice, the 
statute allows for judicial review of the clerk’s determination.103   
Oklahoma applies bright-line tests in determining eligibility for many 
other state-funded assistance programs. For example, the Oklahoma Higher 
Learning Access Program assists qualifying students in paying for 
postsecondary education.104 One of the requirements is that students 
“establish[] financial need,”105 which is determined based on parental (or in 
some circumstances student) income at the time of application.106 
  
                                                                                                                 
 97. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 50 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in the result). 
 98. FLA. STAT. § 27.52 (2012). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. An act is ministerial if it is “[o]f or relating to an act that involves obedience to 
instructions or laws instead of discretion, judgment, or skill.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
1086 (9th ed. 2009). 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Also known as “Oklahoma’s Promise.” 70 OKLA. STAT. § 2602 (2009). 
 105. Id. § 2603. 
 106. Id. § 2605. The general standard imposes a strict income level cutoff of $50,000 to 
qualify for this program. Id. Slightly different standards apply for children who have been 
adopted out of the foster system. See id. § 2603.  
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2. The Benefits and Costs of Using a Bright-Line Test 
A bright-line approach has some appealing features. First, it is efficient. 
Rather than requiring judges to expend time reviewing a theoretically 
endless set of factors, one could simply hire someone to determine whether 
or not the applicant’s income is less than, equal to, or greater than the cutoff 
amount.107 More importantly, such an approach would establish near perfect 
uniformity, at least among those with similar income levels. The 
introductory scenario would likely no longer occur. Ann and Bob would 
either both be deemed indigent, and consequently given court-appointed 
attorneys, or neither of them would. 
But at what cost should this approach be taken? All bright-line rules tend 
to oversimplify complex situations and fail to consider unusual or 
unforeseen applications. For example, a clerk using income as a bright-line 
cutoff, as Oklahoma does with other assistance programs, considers only 
the amount of an applicant’s income, not what they are able to do with it. 
Strict income cutoffs do not consider the quantity, quality, or liquidity of 
assets. Nor do such cutoffs consider the debts, liabilities, or other 
obligations that limit the ability of the applicant to hire an attorney. Finally, 
these systems consider only the ability to hire an attorney generally, without 
considering the complexity of the case and the unique needs of the 
particular defendant. There are many important considerations that are 
simply not encompassed in strict income cutoffs.   
Bright-line tests tend to focus on one (or few) consideration(s), while 
disregarding other factors that Oklahoma lawmakers have repeatedly 
deemed important. The Oklahoma Supreme Court first enumerated the list 
of relevant factors in Cleek v. State.108 In finding that these factors are 
relevant in determining indigency status, the court relied on a case from the 
Washington Supreme Court, Morgan v. Rhay.109 The latter court articulated 
the need for an evaluation of factors to shed light on the applicant’s entire 
financial situation:   
To qualify for appointed counsel, it is not necessary that an 
accused person be utterly destitute or totally insolvent. Indigence 
                                                                                                                 
 107. In order to take into consideration the variances in the cost of living among cities or 
counties in Oklahoma, the income cutoffs would need to vary depending on the particular 
applicant’s city or county of residence. 
 108. See Cleek v. State, 1987 OK CR 278, ¶ 5, 748 P.2d 39, 40 (overruled in part by 
Norton v. State, 2002 OK CR 10, ¶ 12, 43 P.3d 404, 408); see also OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 
1.14. To review the list of factors again, see supra text accompanying notes 48-49. 
 109. Cleek, ¶ 5, 748 P.2d at 40. 
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is a relative term, and must be considered and measured in each 
case by reference to the need or service to be met or furnished. 
In connection with the constitutional right to counsel, it properly 
connotes a state of impoverishment or lack of resources which, 
when realistically viewed in the light of everyday practicalities, 
effectually impairs or prevents the employment and retention of 
competent counsel.110 
The legislature later adopted this view when it passed the Indigent Defense 
Act, which allowed the Court of Criminal Appeals to promulgate factors to 
be considered in the trial judge’s determination.111 Had the Oklahoma 
legislature not approved of the approach taken in Cleek, it could have 
altered it when it passed the Indigent Defense Act. Moreover, the judiciary 
has maintained this view, as evidenced by the decision of the Court of 
Criminal Appeals to adopt the Cleek factors in exercising its power to 
determine the standards for indigency.112 The evolution of Oklahoma’s 
current system seems to reflect state lawmakers’ shared belief that 
indigency is a complex equation that cannot be calculated with a simple 
comparison of two numbers. 
B. Option 2: Mimicking the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
1. Overview of the Original Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
In the past several decades, the federal government has struggled with 
weighing the pros and cons of judicial discretion in criminal sentencing. 
Prior to 1987, federal judges were given broad discretion in sentencing.113 
The only hard limitation on their discretion was the statutory maximums.114 
So long as they stayed within the statutory maximums, judges were allowed 
to “consider any factors they deemed relevant” and impose any punishment 
they thought proper, including fines, probation, incarceration, or any 
combination thereof.115 Moreover, these decisions were not subject to 
review by appellate courts.116   
                                                                                                                 
 110. Morgan v. Rhay, 470 P.2d 180, 182 (Wash. 1970). 
 111. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355A (2011). 
 112. OKLA. CT. CRIM. APP. R. 1.14. 
 113. Rebecca S. Henry, The Virtue in Discretion: Ethics, Justice, and Why Judges Must 
Be ‘Students of the Soul’, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 65, 89-90 & n.87 (1999) 
(citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989)). 
 114. Id. at 89. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97 (1996) (“We agree that Congress 
was concerned about sentencing disparities [in enacting the Guidelines], but we are just as 
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Granting federal judges such broad discretion had its benefits—the 
resulting “flexibility and individual attention” promoted the incorporation 
of rehabilitation in sentencing.117 Yet, the discretion also led to vast 
disparities in sentencing.118 These disparities “rais[ed] concerns about 
equality, proportionality, and improper discrimination.”119 In response to 
these concerns, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (Sentencing 
Act), which took effect in April of 1987.120 
The Sentencing Act attempted to promote greater uniformity among 
federal criminal sentencing, while still allowing federal judges to impose 
individualized sentences when warranted.121 Congress attempted to meet 
these competing objectives by creating a system with two distinct 
features.122 The first primary feature, which is intended to promote 
uniformity, is a sentencing grid that lists forty-three types of offenses on the 
vertical axis and six classifications of criminal history on the horizontal 
axis.123 Once federal judges have categorized both the offense and the 
defender’s criminal history, they are instructed to find the intersection 
between these two numbers.124 That point of intersection contains a 
sentencing range, in which the high end of the range is no more than 
twenty-five percent greater than the lower end of the range.125 Judges are 
instructed to impose a sentence within the designated range.126   
                                                                                                                 
convinced that Congress did not intend, by establishing appellate review, to vest in appellate 
courts wide-ranging authority over district court sentencing decisions.”)).  
 117. Id. at 90. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (citing Karen Bornstein, 5K2.0 Departures for 5H Individual Characteristics: A 
Backdoor Out of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 135, 139 
(1993), Michael S. Gelacak, Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, Departures Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. 
REV. 305, 306 (1996), Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging 
Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1991), John M. Walker, Jr., Loosening the Administrative Handcuffs: Discretion 
and Responsibility Under the Guidelines, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 551 (1993)); see also 
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which 
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (1988). 
 120. Id. at 90-91. 
 121. Id. at 91 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)(B) (West 1999)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. The Sentencing Act originally made the guidelines mandatory. 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(b)(1) (2006). In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court severed the mandatory 
provision in order for the Act to comply with the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial requirements. 
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The second characteristic of the Sentencing Act is that it provides two 
escape hatches for federal judges to use when the application of the grid 
would be inappropriate.127 These escape hatches are intended to promote 
sentences that are proportional to the specific facts of the crime.128 The first 
escape hatch gives the judge the opportunity to alter the base offense before 
finding the point of intersection.129 If certain specific facts exist, such as the 
use of a gun in the commission of the crime, the judge can bump the base 
offense up or down as he sees fit.130 Altering the input (types of offenses) 
consequently alters the outcome (resulting point of intersection), allowing 
the judge to slightly change the sentencing he is instructed to impose.131 
The second escape hatch allows federal judges to wholly depart from the 
guidelines.132 This latter mechanism is only permitted “[w]hen a court finds 
an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies 
but where conduct significantly differs from the norm.”133 
2. Creating a Similar Test for Use in Indigency Determination 
Like the federal criminal sentencing guidelines, indigency determination 
methods must strike a balance between flexibility and uniformity. As such, 
Oklahoma could adopt a system for determining indigency that is similar to 
the Sentencing Act’s method of setting sentences. Although different 
factors would need to be considered, the same general principles could be 
incorporated into a system for determining indigency. The state legislature, 
the Court of Criminal Appeals, or even OIDS could develop set outcomes 
depending on variations in the factors listed in Rule 1.14.134 Judges would 
then need to follow this set system unless unique circumstances justify 
departure from that outcome. 
                                                                                                                 
543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005). This severance stemmed from the Court’s prior holding that any 
fact, other than the defendant’s prior conviction, that enhances the defendant’s sentence 
beyond the “statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” in order to comply with the Sixth Amendment. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  
 127. Id. at 92-93. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2, 3 (1998)). 
 130. Id. at 92. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 93. 
 133. Id. at 94 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 129, at ch. 1, pt. A.4(b), 
introductory cmt.).  
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. 
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As discussed above, Oklahoma lawmakers have enumerated a list of 
factors that they deem relevant in determining indigency. These factors 
were set forth in earlier cases and adopted in Rule 1.14 of the Oklahoma 
Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.135 The consistent reaffirmation of 
these factors demonstrates that lawmakers believe they are crucial in 
determining indigency. As such, all ten factors should be incorporated into 
a system of predetermined outcomes. Furthermore, Oklahoma lawmakers 
have determined that great weight should be placed on whether an applicant 
is able to post bond.136 As such, that factor should be given greater weight 
than the other factors. An applicant’s posting of bond could raise a 
presumption that he is not indigent, which would require a higher showing 
of need in the subsequent analysis.137 
The following weighted point system, which I have created for purposes 
of this Comment, could be used to determine indigency based on an 
evaluation of the remaining factors in Rule 1.14. For every factor that 
reflects an ability to hire an attorney, at least one point would be added to 
the applicant’s running total. The more that factor demonstrates ability to 
pay, the more points would be added. Likewise, for every factor that would 
prevent an applicant from being able to afford an attorney, at least one point 
would be deducted from the running total. The more that factor would 
prevent hiring an attorney, the more points would be deducted.  
For example, an applicant could be assigned a point for every $10,000 he 
earns annually. An applicant making less than $10,000 per year would 
receive zero points, an applicant making between $10,000 and $20,000 per 
year would receive one point, and so forth. Similarly, an applicant could 
have one point deducted for every $10,000 of debt owed. An applicant with 
less than $10,000 worth of debt would have one point deducted, an 
applicant with $10,000 to $20,000 worth of debt would have two points 
deducted, and so forth.138 Points could be added as assets, earning capacity, 
willingness of family to assist, credit standing, and financial history 
increase. Similarly, points could be deducted as debts or liabilities, living 
expenses, family size, and number of dependents increase.  
                                                                                                                 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 44-54. 
 136. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355A (2011); 20 OKLA. STAT. § 55 (2011). 
 137. This Comment does not seek to endorse the legislature’s decision to create this 
presumption. It simply attempts to develop a test that reflects what Oklahoma lawmakers 
have demonstrated to be important in the analysis. For a criticism on this approach, see 
Kuhns, supra note 20, at 1787. 
 138. These numbers are intended only to serve as examples. Different increments and 
allocation of points could be determined. These numbers were selected for simplicity. 
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Once all nine of these factors are given point allocations, the total points 
would be summed. The number of points tallied at the end would then 
determine whether or not the applicant receives a court-appointed attorney. 
The higher the number, the more likely the applicant can afford an attorney. 
A particular sum could be designated as a cut-off for those who posted 
bond, while a higher sum is set for those who did not post bond. 
Of course, relying solely on the tallying of points may focus too much on 
uniformity, thus restricting the flexibility that may be necessary to reach the 
right outcome in atypical cases. To mitigate this danger, the test should be 
supplemented by the second part of the Sentencing Act’s original format, 
thus allowing judges to either adjust the analysis slightly or wholly depart 
from the point system, if necessary.139  
3. The Benefits and Costs of Mimicking the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines 
The value of selecting this type of indigency determination scheme is 
threefold. First, it incorporates a more thorough analysis than a simple one-
factor bright-line test and thus more accurately reflects one’s financial 
status. As such, it honors the decision of Oklahoma lawmakers to consider 
numerous factors in rendering a decision on indigency status. Second, it 
promotes greater uniformity by focusing the decision on an objective, 
quantitative analysis rather than on the varying discretion of judges. Third, 
it still retains an escape hatch that would allow judges to intervene in those 
instances where the interests of justice are promoted more by straying from 
the grid than by deferring to it. In sum, the benefit of this scheme is that it 
does more to find a comfortable middle ground—the judge is not granted 
unfettered discretion and no single factor is dispositive. Rather, this scheme 
requires a more comprehensive analysis, while still promoting uniformity.  
The downfalls of this scheme are also threefold. First, the escape hatch 
would have to be ambiguous, which thwarts the ability to fully resolve 
issues of uniformity, predictability, and equality by making it unclear when 
departure is appropriate. For example, it would be unclear what facts make 
                                                                                                                 
 139. The Sixth Amendment’s requirement of a jury trial does not affect indigency 
determination like it does federal sentencing. As discussed in note 126, supra, the Supreme 
Court made the Sentencing Act advisory in order to comply with the Sixth Amendment’s 
requirement that facts used to enhance a defendant’s sentence be submitted to a jury and 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005); 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The facts that influence a determination 
of indigency do not require a finding by a jury. Therefore, the initial framework set forth by 
Congress can appropriately be applied to an indigency determination scheme.  
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a case so unusual as to justify a different outcome, what interests of justice 
should be considered, and how much weight those considerations should 
carry. Despite these concerns, the escape hatch must be ambiguous in order 
for it to function properly. After all, a major benefit of having an escape 
hatch is to allow judges to respond to unforeseen circumstances.  
Second, this scheme is similar to the federal sentencing guidelines, 
which have been critiqued by one federal judge as being “so cruelly 
delusive as to make those who have to apply the guidelines to human 
beings, families, and the community want to weep.”140 Unfortunately, 
systems that promote uniformity over judicial discretion tend to have this 
effect because they conform to a set scale designed to render a 
predetermined outcome. Such schemes do not allow the judge to make a 
decision based on what he believes would be best for the individual 
applicant. However, such a system is required to promote uniformity. 
Allowing judges to determine outcomes on a case-by-case, applicant-by-
applicant analysis, guided by their personal observations and intuitions, is 
what creates a lack of uniformity. The trade-off between flexibility and 
uniformity persists throughout all systems. Given that a lack of uniformity 
often leads to unpredictability and inequality before the law, the detriment 
that results to flexibility is simply a consequence that must be accepted. 
Third, applying a sentence based on a predetermined point system means 
that “the judge’s task is largely ministerial,” which one might argue could 
be accomplished just as competently by a preprogrammed computer.141 
This is another critique commonly attributed to the federal sentencing 
guidelines that also applies to indigency determination schemes. If that 
critique is true, then it would follow that retaining the judge as the decision 
maker is a waste of judicial resources. If the judge imparts no special 
expertise in the decision-making process, then it would be more resourceful 
to have a clerk, a bureaucrat, or a computer program make the decision.  
This critique is even more appropriate for indigency determination 
schemes than for federal criminal sentencing. Sentencing decisions require 
a comprehensive knowledge of the law and the facts. A judge is uniquely 
specialized to make this decision for two reasons. First, he possesses a 
greater understanding of the law as a result of his education and experience. 
Second, he possesses a greater understanding of the facts of the case 
because he has overseen the entire trial process and scrutinized all of the 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family, and the 
Community, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169, 169 (1996). 
 141. Fred A. Bernstein, Discretion Redux—Mandatory Minimums, Federal Judges, and 
the “Safety Valve” Provision of the 1994 Crime Act, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 765, 770 (1995). 
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evidence. Thus, a judge plays a vital, irreplaceable role in sentencing 
decisions.  
The same is not true, however, for determining indigency. Although the 
determination does require some comprehension of the legal system, such 
as knowing how much legal work will be required to mount a defense in a 
particular case, a thorough understanding of the law is not necessary to 
determine the applicant’s financial standing. Moreover, deciding one’s 
indigency status requires the decision maker to understand and be familiar 
with an entirely different set of facts. In deciding an appropriate sentence, 
one must understand the facts of the crime. In contrast, deciding indigency 
status requires an understanding of the applicant’s financial situation. 
Although some facts may overlap at times, they generally will not. Thus, 
the judge gains no unique insight by presiding over the case. Even if he did, 
determining indigency is a preliminary decision that is made before the 
facts of the case are determined. Because the judge’s education, experience, 
and positioning offer no unique insight into the determination of indigency 
status, the decision may be made more efficiently by someone else. 
The bottom line is that judicial discretion creates concerns of inequality, 
unpredictability, and a lack of uniformity for both federal sentencing and 
indigency determination. The original framework of the Sentencing Act 
mitigates these concerns by creating a system that promotes uniform 
results, while still allowing for proportionality in unusual circumstances. A 
similar system could be used to determine indigency status in Oklahoma. 
Unfortunately, the competing values of uniformity, equality, and 
predictability will continue to be in tension with ideas of individualized 
decision-making and flexibility, regardless of what test Oklahoma uses to 
determine indigency. But if uniformity is viewed as paramount, then a 
system that mimics the original framework of the Sentencing Act would be 
highly beneficial because it would promote uniformity while still 
incorporating a thorough analysis. Moreover, many of the downfalls that 
exist in federal criminal sentencing are not applicable to indigency 
determination.  
C. Option 3: Transferring the Decision-Making Power to OIDS 
Eighteen states use a test that grants broad discretion in determining 
indigency but places the decision-making power in the hands of someone 
other than the trial judge assigned to the case.142 Fourteen of these states 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See infra Appendix A. 
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give the decision-making power to the public defender program.143 
Although public defender programs vary among states—and possibly even 
among counties144—they are generally organizations that employ local 
attorneys to provide representation to indigent defendants in the jurisdiction 
for which they are responsible.145 Oklahoma has three public defender 
programs—Oklahoma and Tulsa counties each have their own programs, 
while OIDS represents the remaining seventy-five counties.146  
OIDS is structured as a bureaucratic agency. It is headed by a Board of 
Directors, consisting of five members who are appointed by the governor 
and confirmed by the state senate.147 The Board selects an executive 
director to manage the operations of the agency and implement the 
mission.148 The executive director oversees all five subdivisions of the 
agency—operations, trial representation, appellate representation, 
noncapital contracts, and forensic testing services—each of which has a 
division chief that supervises his or her subordinates and reports back to the 
executive director.149 This organizational structure, which has a hierarchy of 
authority and specialization of tasks, is a common bureaucratic one.150  
Bureaucracies have distinct characteristics that affect whether such an 
institution is the proper place for indigency determination. Max Weber, the 
German social science scholar, studied the concept of bureaucracies.151 
Some of his most notable studies have been consolidated by Peter M. Blau 
and Marshall W. Meyer, both modern American sociologists, into a 
convenient list of bureaucratic characteristics.152 The full list includes:  
 
o clear-cut division of labor;  
o organization according to the principles of hierarchy; 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Id. 
 144. 19 OKLA. STAT. § 138.1a(A) (2011); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 55. 
 145. Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the 
United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 36 (1995). 
 146. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 55. 
 147. 2012 Annual Report, supra note 28, at 3. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 15; Telephone Interview with Joe Robertson, supra note 96. 
 150. See PETER M. BLAU & MARSHALL W. MEYER, BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN SOCIETY 9 
(3d ed. 1987).  
 151. His works include FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (H.H. Gerth & C. 
Wright Mills trans. & eds., 1946) [hereinafter WEBER, ESSAYS], and MAX WEBER, THE 
THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 330 (A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons 
trans., Talcott Parsons ed., 1947) [hereinafter WEBER, THEORY]. 
 152. BLAU & MEYER, supra note 150, at 19-24. 
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o operations governed by a consistent application of abstract rules;  
o environment that promotes formalistic impersonality;  
o meritorious employment and job security;  
o capability of being highly efficient;  
o tendency to monopolize information;  
o resistance to change; and  
o ambivalence toward democracy.153  
 
It is difficult to determine precisely how these factors would manifest 
themselves if OIDS were to make the determination of indigency, as doing 
so would require the creation of an entirely new division to handle this 
unique task. The following analysis reviews the traits that would be 
applicable to transferring the decision-making power of indigency status to 
OIDS and assumes that these traits would manifest themselves in the 
manner predicted by Weber. 
1. The Upside of Bureaucracies  
Bureaucracies distribute regularly conducted activities “in a fixed way as 
official duties,” which promotes a clear-cut division of labor.154 This 
generally leads to the employment of experts with specialized knowledge of 
their particular task.155 OIDS is composed of workers who specialize in the 
representation of indigents.156 Trial judges, on the other hand, review a 
variety of cases, only some of which deal with indigent criminal 
defendants. The specialized training, knowledge, and experience that OIDS 
employees have as a result of the clear division  of labor mean that they 
are more familiar with the issues that indigents face and the factors that 
influence indigents’ ability to mount a successful defense. Given their 
unique perspective, OIDS staff may be able to make better decisions 
concerning the qualifications and representation of indigents than trial 
judges.  
As evidenced by their structure, bureaucracies are organized in a way 
that “follows the principle of hierarchy . . . [where] each lower office is 
under the control and supervision of a higher one.”157 Thus, every 
bureaucratic official is accountable to her supervisor for the work done and 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 19 (quoting HOWARD ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS 6-14 
(1979)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Telephone Interview with Joe Robertson, supra note 96.  
 157. WEBER, ESSAYS, supra note 151, at 331.  
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the decisions rendered.158 This system of accountability is beneficial 
because it creates an internal check on decision-making processes.159 
Although the decisions of trial judges are reviewed by appellate courts, 
great deference is generally given to trial judges.160 Moreover, appellate 
review is rarely ever as immediate as that which occurs within 
bureaucracies.161 Consistent accountability is preferable when delegating 
the decision to a single person who may be influenced by personal bias or 
other motives. 
The operations of bureaucracies are characteristically governed by the 
application of a “consistent system of abstract rules” to particular facts for 
the sole purpose of “assur[ing] uniformity in the performance of every task, 
regardless of the number of persons engaged in it.”162 Emphasizing the 
abstract set of rules that dictate the decisions of all members in a 
bureaucracy assists in removing bias from the decisions of each individual 
member and promotes equality before the law.163 Although the judiciary 
also seeks to apply a “consistent system of abstract rules,” it does not 
always do so with the objective of uniformity in mind. If the goal of a test is 
to promote uniformity, then it is preferable to seek a decision maker known 
for demanding uniformity.  
The personnel policies of bureaucracies, such as the “protect[ion] against 
arbitrary dismissal,” tend to promote organizational loyalty and personal 
identification with the agency’s objectives.164 Conformity to group values is 
a beneficial trait when uniformity is the objective. If all applications for 
indigency determination are submitted to a small group of like-minded 
people, who all personally identify with the overall mission of the 
organization, then the decisions will presumably be more uniform. For 
example, in the introductory scenario, Ann and Bob were assigned to 
separate judges, who made different decisions. Because each judge’s 
decision was based on his personal assessment of the applicant’s financial 
standing, they rendered contradictory decisions. This discrepancy likely 
would not have occurred if the determinations were made by a small group 
of like-minded coworkers.  
                                                                                                                 
 158. BLAU & MEYER, supra note 150, at 19. 
 159. Id. at 21.  
 160. See Brewer v. State, 1975 OK CR 52, ¶ 8, 533 P.2d 645, 646-47 (declaring that the 
trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to appoint counsel). 
 161. See BLAU & MEYER, supra note 150, at 19. 
 162. Id. at 20. 
 163. Id. at 24. 
 164. Id. at 21. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
680 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:655 
 
 
2. The Downside of Bureaucracies 
In theory, bureaucracies are “capable of attaining the highest degree of 
efficiency” because they are more likely to work like a well-greased 
machine than other forms of organizations.165 Although there are likely 
beneficial economies of scale to be recognized in consolidating wide-spread 
decision making into one organized unit, reality does not always support 
that general theory.166 In contrast, bureaucratic agencies are notorious for 
being inefficient, especially with time.167 Even relatively minimal delays 
may be consequential when the timing of a decision may affect the merits 
of a case. For example, criminal defendants in Oklahoma have only “ninety 
(90) days from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment and 
sentence” to perfect appeal.168 Thus, a prolonged decision on whether or not 
a criminal defendant will have court-appointed representation to assist in 
his appeal could seriously affect his ability to seek post-judgment relief. Of 
course, the legislature could impose a statutory deadline on determining 
whether an applicant qualifies for court-appointed representation to hedge 
the risk that a decision may be delayed, consequently affecting the merits of 
the case. 
Unfortunately, bureaucracies tend to monopolize information.169 In an 
attempt to “increase the superiority of the professionally informed,” 
bureaucrats often keep their information and intentions from the general 
public.170 Refusal to disclose acquired information and the reasons for 
making decisions limits the external accountability of a bureaucracy. 
Although bureaucracies maintain a system of accountability within the 
                                                                                                                 
 165. WEBER, THEORY, supra note 151, at 337; see also WEBER, ESSAYS, supra note 151, 
at 214. Weber’s analysis was based on how an “ideal” bureaucracy would function, which 
would generally work for defining common characteristics, but may be flawed in reality. 
BLAU & MEYER, supra note 150, at 25. 
 166. CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL ET AL., ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND 
POLICIES 153-54 (19th ed. 2012). “Economies of scale” is defined as the “reductions in the 
average total cost of producing a product as the firm expands the size of plant (its output) in 
the long run; the economies of mass production.” Id. at G7. As wide-spread decision making 
becomes consolidated into a large bureaucracy, those decisions are likely to become more 
easily made and more consistent. Id. at 153-54. The average cost, of time and money, 
reduces as these decisions become more concentrated. Id. 
 167. Allan Brownfield, The Inherent Inefficiency of Government Bureaucracy, FOUND. 
FOR ECON. EDUC. (FEE) (June 1, 1977), available at http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/ 
the-inherent-inefficiency-of-government-bureaucracy/#ixzz2Eybrlrmh. 
 168. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1054 (2011). 
 169. BLAU & MEYER, supra note 150, at 23. 
 170. Id. 
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organization, an ideal accountability system would reach beyond the 
bounds of the organization, rendering bureaucratic decision makers 
accountable not only to their supervisors but also to other governmental 
actors and the public at large. Because bureaucracies tend to monopolize 
information, a check would need to be placed on OIDS to ensure that it 
shares information and makes appropriate decisions.  
Some states that place the decision in the hands of the public defender’s 
office explicitly authorize the courts to review the decision when 
necessary.171 One court justified such a system by emphasizing the 
importance of the court functioning as the “ultimate protector” of an 
indigent’s right to counsel.172 If Oklahoma transfers the decision of 
indigency status to OIDS, it too can mitigate the shortcomings of 
bureaucracies by placing a check in the judiciary. 
Assigning decision-making power to bureaucratic agencies carries risks, 
such as monopolization of information, a lack of external accountability, 
and possible inefficiency. But so long as proper checks are established to 
mitigate these risks, such as judicial review and statutory deadlines, many 
benefits can be realized by allowing OIDS to make the determination of 
indigency. Compared to trial judges, bureaucrats are subject to more 
frequent and immediate accountability. Moreover, the specialized 
knowledge gained from working exclusively in indigent criminal defense 
provides OIDS workers with greater insight into the needs and realities of 
indigent defendants. Finally, the structure and environment of a 
bureaucratic agency tends to promote uniformity in decision making. It 
appears that OIDS can contribute greatly to the determination of indigency 
due to its bureaucratic structure. 
It is important to note that to yield the benefits of uniformity and 
efficiency that the public defender’s office has to offer, the decision should 
be made on a state level. If each county’s public defender system appointed 
a single person to determine indigency status, then it would promote 
uniformity only at the county level. There would still likely be a lack of 
uniformity between counties. Thus, promoting uniformity requires that the 
state public defender’s office be the one to make the determination. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 171. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 802-4 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-111 
(2011). 
 172. Office of Pub. Defender v. State, 993 A.2d 55, 67 (Md. 2010) (quoting Baldwin v. 
State, 444 A.2d 1058, 1067 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)). 
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V. The Suggested Approach 
The introductory scenario reveals a major downfall in Oklahoma’s 
current approach to determining indigency. Granting judges broad 
discretion in determining indigency may result in a lack of uniformity—
even in very similar situations—both within and among different counties 
across the state. To assist in promoting greater uniformity while 
maintaining focus on the factors enumerated by Oklahoma lawmakers, the 
state public defender’s office, OIDS, should make the determination of 
indigency by applying a test that mimics the initial federal sentencing 
framework that Congress created under the Sentencing Act.  
A. The Decision Maker: Why OIDS Is the Best Option 
The authority to determine indigency is generally granted in one of three 
persons or institutions.173 Most states follow Oklahoma’s approach and 
leave the decision to the trial judge assigned to the case.174 A large minority 
of states allow public defender’s offices to decide who qualifies for their 
services.175 At least one state classifies the decision as a ministerial task 
assigned to the court clerk.176 Oklahoma should follow the large minority’s 
approach and transfer the decision to OIDS because of its unique structure, 
insight, and expertise. 
There are numerous benefits to be realized by transferring indigency 
determinations to OIDS.177 The bureaucratic environment tends to promote 
impersonal application of established standards to every situation, which 
promotes greater uniformity. Moreover, a system of internal accountability 
would facilitate more frequent and quicker review of the decisions made, 
which would further ensure uniformity, equality, and predictability. Of 
course, there are certain downfalls associated with the bureaucratic agency, 
including a lack of external accountability, monopolization of information, 
and possible inefficiency. But, these risks can be mitigated by statutorily 
regulating the determination process and by retaining the judiciary as a 
check on OIDS.178 
Because OIDS coordinates the defense of most of Oklahoma’s indigents, 
either by providing the defense itself or at least by handling the contracts 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See infra Appendix A. 
 174. See infra Appendix A. 
 175. See infra Appendix A. 
 176. FLA. STAT. § 27.52 (2012). 
 177. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 178. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
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when the defense is delegated to private attorneys,179 its staff possesses a 
better understanding of what is required to mount an adequate defense. As 
such, OIDS staff members are uniquely positioned to understand what 
resources are needed in order to make that defense. They are just as 
competent as the courts to investigate and understand the financial status of 
applicants. But their unique position allows them to better understand 
whether or not the applicant’s financial status will be adequate in mounting 
a proper defense. 
With most decisions that are left to judges, such as criminal sentencing, 
the judge possesses unique expertise as a result of his education, experience 
and positioning throughout the trial. The same is not true in determining 
indigency.180 The determination is made prior to trial and is generally made 
upon review of facts different from those presented at trial. Moreover, no 
legal training or experience is required to determine the financial standing 
of an applicant, although some understanding of the criminal justice system 
and judicial process is necessary. As such, the determination of indigency is 
different than those decisions that are properly left to judges because the 
judge retains no unique insight in the former.  
Finally, categorizing the determination of indigency status as a 
“ministerial act” rather than an “exercise of independent judgment,” as is 
done in Florida,181 oversimplifies the process and prohibits any exercise of 
discretion. As mentioned throughout this Comment, the exercise of 
discretion is a beneficial escape hatch because predetermined laws do not 
always render the intended outcome. Some element of discretion should be 
retained in the determination scheme to provide for those situations in 
which application of the test would result in a clearly unjust outcome. The 
determination should not be left to a clerk for the same reasons that it 
should not left to a judge—that is, because they possess no unique and 
beneficial insight, gained through their education, experience, or 
positioning, that adds value to their decision. On the other hand, OIDS does 
possess a beneficial viewpoint. Additionally, it maintains an environment 
that promotes greater uniformity, even when discretion is utilized. As such, 
OIDS is the best institution to make the determination of indigency. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 179. See supra Part III.A. 
 180. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 181. FLA. STAT. § 27.52. 
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B. The Test That Should Be Applied: Why a Predetermined Point System 
Supplemented with a Discretionary Escape Hatch Is Best 
To further increase uniformity among indigency determinations, 
Oklahoma should transfer the decision-making power for every county, 
including Tulsa and Oklahoma counties, to OIDS. In making that decision, 
OIDS should exercise limited discretion and apply a test similar to that 
originally used in federal criminal sentencing under the Sentencing Act. 
Although some level of discretion should be retained, the primary focus of 
the new test should be to promote uniformity, predictability, and equality 
among applicants throughout the state of Oklahoma. 
The discretion given to OIDS should be narrower than that currently 
granted to the judiciary. The state legislature should develop a system that 
determines indigency based on a point system that reflects the factors that 
Oklahoma lawmakers have repeatedly confirmed as important in 
determining indigency.182 An applicant’s total points would increase with 
the factors that suggest an ability to obtain counsel and decrease with those 
factors that reduce the ability to do so. Such a test would constrain the 
discretion of OIDS by ensuring which factors are considered and what 
weight is assigned to each. It further controls the interaction of those factors 
and ensures that each one is considered in the analysis. Because OIDS 
would be limited in deciding what factors to consider, what weight to apply 
to them, and how they should interact—all decisions that judges are 
currently allowed to make on their own—OIDS would have less discretion 
in making the determination than judges currently have. This constrained 
discretion would further promote uniformity among decisions. 
Yet some level of discretion is necessary because unforeseen 
circumstances arise that make the test inapplicable, or at least less 
applicable. In order for OIDS to respond to these unusual circumstances, 
the reviewers must retain limited discretion. Therefore, the test should 
include an escape hatch, as was done in the Sentencing Act.183 This escape 
hatch should allow OIDS to depart from the predetermined analysis when 
circumstances warrant it. The language needs to be ambiguous to provide 
opportunity to respond to unforeseen circumstances, but it should be made 
clear that departures are the exception to the rule. Discretion to respond in 
unusual cases should be given to OIDS, as opposed to the trial judge or a 
court clerk. 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 183. See supra Part IV.B. 
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Adopting a predetermined point system with a discretionary escape hatch 
is far superior to applying a bright-line test. Although bright-line tests 
promote uniformity, they merely trade one potential injustice for another. A 
bright-line rule makes certain predetermined, measurable factors the only 
things that matter. Moreover, such a test would remove from the 
determination several important factors that Oklahoma lawmakers have 
repeatedly considered relevant in making that decision. Thus, although 
people with similar situations may get the same result, the outcomes may 
still lack fairness because of the limited way in which indigency would be 
determined.  
The recommended approach is also superior to retaining a discretionary 
test but placing the decision-making power in the hands of OIDS.184 Unlike 
the bright-line test, which bases the entire decision on one or few 
dispositive factors, the current discretionary test facilitates a more thorough 
consideration by incorporating more relevant factors into the decision-
making process. Moreover, for the reasons stated above, transferring the 
decision-making authority to OIDS would likely increase the uniformity 
among decisions, even if the same test were applied.185 However, granting 
broad discretion creates an increased risk that the resulting decisions will 
lack uniformity, predictability, and equality, regardless of who the decision 
maker is.186 Although transferring the decision to OIDS would improve the 
uniformity of decisions, it will only do so to a degree unless a change is 
also made to the decision-making process. 
The recommendation to transfer the decision to OIDS and apply a new 
test is not intended to suggest that OIDS should go unchecked. Those 
within OIDS who make the determination of indigency should be subject to 
two layers of accountability: one within the bureaucratic agency and one 
outside of it. The public defender system should include in its current 
annual report a section that tracks the uniformity of decisions rendered and 
searches for any disparate treatment. Moreover, trial judges should not be 
completely stripped of their involvement. Rather, the judiciary should 
maintain its role as the “ultimate protector” of the right to counsel and 
remain as an external check on OIDS.187 In pre-trial proceedings, the judge 
should ensure that OIDS has not abused its decision-making authority and 
limited discretion in determining the indigency status of the criminal 
defendant. 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See supra Part IV.C. 
 185. See supra Part V.A. 
 186. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 187. Baldwin v. State, 444 A.2d 1058, 1067 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982). 
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“Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented 
by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any 
other rights he may have.”188 Those words, written a half century ago by 
Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer, reveal the importance of 
ensuring that those who cannot obtain counsel by their own means are 
appointed counsel.189 To preserve this right and to ensure that all criminal 
defendants have equal access to adequate counsel, Oklahoma should alter 
its current indigency determination scheme to promote greater uniformity.  
The power to determine indigency should be transferred to the state 
public defender program, the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System. This 
transfer of authority will utilize the unique strengths that result from a 
bureaucratic structure and the specialized expertise that comes from 
working with indigent defendants on a daily basis. Moreover, the special 
insight that judges generally bring to decision-making processes as a result 
of their legal training, experience, and unique positioning at trial are not 
necessary for determining indigency. 
To further maximize uniformity, Oklahoma should alter the test used to 
determine indigency status. This Comment proposes a new test, which 
mimics the initial framework established by Congress for use in federal 
criminal sentencing. The new test would determine indigency based on a 
point system that considers the ten factors repeatedly deemed important by 
Oklahoma lawmakers. This system would promote greater uniformity by 
guiding OIDS to a predetermined outcome. Yet, it would also incorporate 
escape hatches to allow for adjustments to or departures from the 
predetermined outcomes in atypical cases, where the point system results in 
an unforeseen injustice.  
These two changes, taken together, would promote greater uniformity in 
Oklahoma’s indigency determination scheme. If these recommendations are 
effectuated, it is likely that Ann and Bob, or any other two people with 
similar financial means, will receive an equal opportunity to succeed in 
Oklahoma’s criminal defense system. 
 
Carrie Savage Phillips 
  
                                                                                                                 
 188. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (quoting Walter Schaefer, 
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)). 
 189. Id. 
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APPENDIX A: INDIGENCY DETERMINATION SCHEMES CHART 
 
APPROACHES TO DETERMINING INDIGENCY: BY STATE
State Decision Maker Test190 Source 
Alabama Judge Discretionary factors191 
ALA. CODE § 15-
12-5 (LexisNexis 
2011)
Alaska Judge Discretionary factors 
ALASKA STAT. § 
18.85.120 (2012) 
Arizona Judge Discretionary factors 
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 
Rule 6.4 cmt. 
(2007)
Arkansas Judge Discretionary factors 
ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-87-213 
(2005)
California Judge Discretionary192 
CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 27707 
(Deering 2010) 
Colorado Public Defender Discretionary 
COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 21-1-103 
(2012)
Connecticut Public Defender Discretionary 
CONN. GEN. 











DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 29, § 4602 
(2003) 
District of 
Columbia Judge Discretionary 
D.C. CODE  
§ 11-2602 (2012) 
                                                                                                                 
 190. The standards applied to indigency determination schemes have not been reduced to 
categorically defined tests prior to this Comment. For definitions to these tests, see infra 
notes 191-194. 
 191. “Discretionary factors” tests grant the decision maker discretion, but require 
consideration of an enumerated list of factors when exercising that discretion. 
 192. “Discretionary” tests neither impose requirements nor offer guidance to the decision 
maker in exercising discretion. 
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Florida Court Clerk Bright line193 FLA. STAT. § 27.52 (2012) 
Federal 
Government District Judge Discretionary 
28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(1)(2006) 
Georgia Public Defender Discretionary 
GA. CODE ANN. § 
17-12-24 (West 
Supp. 2012) 
Hawaii Public Defender Discretionary 
HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 802-4 (West 
2008)
Idaho Judge Discretionary factors 
IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 19-854 
(2004)
Illinois Judge Discretionary 




Indiana Judge Discretionary 




Iowa Judge Discretionary factors 
IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 815.9 (West 
Supp. 2012) 
Kansas Judge Discretionary factors
KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22-4504 (2007) 
Kentucky Judge Discretionary factors 
KY. REV. STAT. 




                                                                                                                 
 193. “Bright-line” tests set measurable standards for determining indigency, allowing for 
no discretion. 
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LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 15:175 
(Supp. 2012) 
Maine Judge Discretionary factors
ME. R. CRIM. P. 
44





MD. CODE ANN., 










LAWS ch. 211D, § 
2A (2012) 
Michigan Judge Discretionary 
MICH. COMP. 








MINN. STAT.  § 
611.17 (2012) 
Mississippi Judge Discretionary 
MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 99-15-15 (West 
2006) 
Missouri Public Defender Discretionary factors 
MO. ANN. STAT.  
§ 600.086 (West 
2011) 
  
                                                                                                                 
 194. “Presumptive thresholds & discretionary factors” tests combine the “bright line” and 
“discretionary factors tests.” These tests set forth measurable presumptions for indigency, 
such as income levels and receipt of government assistance. This presumption may be 
rebutted if other facts reveal that the applicant can afford an attorney, despite having met the 
threshold. Moreover, applicants who do not meet the threshold may still be appointed 
counsel if, upon review of an enumerated list of relevant factors, the decision maker 
determines that the applicant is unable to afford an attorney. 
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Nebraska Public Defender Discretionary 
NEB. REV. 
STAT.  § 29-
3902 (2008) 
Nevada Judge Discretionary factors 
NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 













New Jersey Judge Discretionary factors 
N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:158A-14 
(West 2011) 
New Mexico Judge Discretionary factors 
N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 31-16-5 
(West 2013) 
New York Judge Discretionary 
N.Y. JUD. LAW 
§ 35 (Consol. 
2006) 
North Carolina Judge Discretionary 
 N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 
7A-450 (West 
2004)
North Dakota Judge Discretionary 
N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 29-32.1-
05 (Supp. 2011) 
Ohio Public Defender Discretionary factors 
OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 
120.03 (Lexis 
Nexis 2007) 
Oklahoma Judge Discretionary factors 
22 OKLA. STAT. 
§ 1355A (2011) 
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Oregon Public Defender Discretionary factors 
OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 151.485 
(2011)
Pennsylvania Judge Discretionary factors
PA. R. CRIM. P. 
122
Rhode Island Public Defender Discretionary factors 
R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 12-15-8 
(West 2006) 
South Carolina Officer Discretionary S.C. APP. CT. R. 602 




Tennessee Judge Discretionary factors 
TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 8-14-205 
(2011) 
Texas Judge Discretionary 
TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 1.051 
(West Supp. 
2012) 
Utah Judge Discretionary factors 
UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-32-










VT. STAT. ANN. 
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Washington Judge Discretionary factors 
WASH. REV. 






(if none exists in 
that circuit, the 




W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 29-21-16 
(Lexis Nexis 
2008)  
Wisconsin Public Defender Discretionary factors 
WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 977.06 
(West Supp. 
2012)
Wyoming Judge Discretionary factors 
WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 7-6-106 
(2013)
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